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Abstract
This paper estimates the impact that Airbus’s presence has had on the market for large
commercial airliners.  Our model reproduces (in a multi-stage) game a stylised characterisation
of six main stages in the development of the large commercial airliner market, allowing for
three players (Boeing, Airbus and McDonnell Douglas) and four market segments.  The model
is then used to ask a number of counterfactual questions about what would have happened in a
variety of circumstances (notably ones in which Airbus did not enter the market).  Besides
capacity and product developments, we also model the level of expenditures on research an
development in order to see whether Airbus’s presence has had an impact on the type and
technological specification of aircrafts produced.  We find that given the prior presence of
McDonnell Douglas in this market, Airbus has had only a modest impact on the prices of
commercial airlines (an average of 3.5%).  The reasons are twofold : first, although the Airbus
presence constraints the actions of Boeing, it weakens the incentive for McDonnell Douglas to
compete vigorously with Boeing.  Secondly, by reducing Boeing’s market share, it prevents the
realisation of the substantial economies of scale and scope that are believed to exist in this
technology.  Overall, this means that the consumer surplus argument for government subsidy to
Airbus is only weakly supported by the model.  Consumer surplus benefits from a challenge to
Boeing have certainly been substantial but most of them could have been achieved by
McDonnell Douglas on its own.  In terms of product development, we find that although
Airbus may have deterred McDonnell Douglas from producing an aircraft in the same category
of the A 300 (medium range, medium-bodied), it may in contrast have actually made it easier3
for McDonnell Douglas to produce the MD-11 in competition with the A 330/340 and the
Boeing 777.  This is because the loss of scale and scope economies by Boeing as a result of the
Airbus entry has substantially raised the cost to Boeing of producing the 777, making entry
more attractive for McDonnell Douglas even when Airbus’s presence is taken into account. 
Finally, we find that the presence of Airbus reduces Boeing’s profits by at least $ 100 bn and
McDonnell Douglas’s by two-thirds.  Airbus itself makes profits which are difficult to estimate
with confidence, but which may lie somewhere between $49bn and $52bn, of the order of a
billion dollars per annum and equivalent to a rate of return over the whole period of between
6% and 11%.   If we give the same weight to profits and consumer surplus, this implies that




When should governments intervene to promote specific types of productive activity in
the economy? Answers to this question have been subject to periodic swings of fashion, but a
consensus has gradually emerged that intervention needs to be based on a sound account of
why unaided markets will fail to encourage adequately efficient levels of the activities
concerned, as well as a reasonable optimism that government failures will not lead to
distortions as significant as those market failures it is sought to correct. The application of this
consensus to actual cases, however, has generated substantial discord, particularly when the
activities under discussion are not public goods, but private goods which for one reason or
another are claimed to be supplied in inadequate quantity or quality. That the state should be a
vigilant referee of the competitive process is a view that would command widespread assent;
that it should be an active player in the competitive game is a much more debated and
debatable claim.
In no specific field of economic activity has the debate been more vigorous than in
commercial aerospace, where production has been supported and encouraged in covert or overt
ways by friendly governments around the world. Many reasons can be imagined for the
favoured status of aerospace, from the cynical ("politicians like shiny toys") to those more
firmly grounded in an analysis of market failure. There are persuasive grounds for thinking that
aerospace is likely to be subject to market failures, notably because of large scale economies in5
production and the importance of research and development. Furthermore, these market
failures are often difficult for individual countries to overcome on their own, so aerospace has
given rise to significant international co-operation, the success or failure of which has
sometimes been seen as an important indicator of the prospects for co-operation in other fields.
The most celebrated instance of such cooperation is the European Airbus consortium,
which was formed in the late 1960s to challenge the dominance of the Boeing Corporation in
world markets; in 1994 for the first time, the former sold more commercial aircraft than the
latter. Its rivalry with Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas (MDD, also of the United States) has
led to fierce claims, in the GATT and other fora, about the role of public funding in generating
"unfair" competition. 
The question what benefits flow from government support for commercial aerospace is
particularly pertinent to Airbus because the consortium owes its very existence to explicit
decisions by collaborating governments. Broadly speaking, three kinds of benefit have been
thought to flow from the Airbus presence in the market for large commercial jet airframes. The
first consists of lower prices to consumers resulting from a challenge to a dominant producer
(Boeing), benefits that could not be supposed to motivate a purely commercial competitor. The
second consists in various kinds of economic spillover from the advanced technology
embodied in the Airbus models; these might consist in the adaptability of technological
advances to other industries, or simply in the spur to technological improvement by Airbus's
own rivals. The third kind of benefit consists in whatever profits accrue to the consortium as a
result of its activities.  However, such profits, if they exist, do not necessarily constitute a case6
for government support, since profits are the reward for any normal unsubsidized commercial
activity.
Two kinds of argument have typically been advanced to show why governments may
be justified in subsidising activities that can be expected to be profitable. The first, which was
doubtless an important motivation for the original launch of the Airbus consortium, is a belief
that private capital markets often fail to fund activities that have a genuine expectation of being
profitable but happen to have a long investment horizon. This may be because private investors
are more averse to risk than governments ought to be, or because of institutional failures (such
as those due to internal agency problems) biasing decision-making towards projects with early
repayment profiles - for example, managers may inflate current profits at the expense of long-
term profits to persuade shareholders of their competence, and this may be rational even if
shareholders know they are doing so (Stein, 1989). Even if correct, such an argument also
requires confidence that government "short-termism" is a less serious problem, a confidence
that can falter in the face of such facts as the date of the British Government's announcement of
launch aid for the Airbus A-330/340 programme, just a few weeks before the general election
of 1987. The second argument, however, is more subtle, and appeals to the possibility that
certain activities may paradoxically be profitable (before subsidies) only because it is known
they enjoy government support. This is because the knowledge of government support may add
vital credibility to a producer's presence in the market, and may deter either predation by an
established rival or entry by a new one.7
This idea that governments can affect the credibility and success of entry enjoyed
something of a vogue in the mid-1980s due to interest in so-called Strategic Trade Policy. 
Governments will typically add to the credibility of entry by committing to absorb whatever
losses will occur and the provision of  finance for fixed development cost (with repayment
linked to performance) will signal this intention.  Such schemes have indeed been the most
important element of public support to the Airbus.  Face with guaranteed entry, Airbus
competitors will presumably alter their competitive strategies (including pricing and product
developments).    In particular, government support for the A-320 programme is often thought
to have induced Boeing to produce a new version of the 737 in the segment for narrow bodied,
small range aircrafts.  In the absence of guaranteed competition, Boeing may have instead
opted for the development of a completely new aircraft in that market.  Similarly, government
support for the A330/340 programme was thought likely not only to deter a very aggressive
response to Airbus from Boeing, but also perhaps to deter McDonnell-Douglas from
developing a long-range medium-bodied aircraft at all, especially given its highly visible
hesitation about whether to continue in the civil side of the aerospace business at all. In the
event, in spite of Airbus and its government support, McDonnell-Douglas went ahead with the
development of the MD-11, a model which is now in production.
Government can also affect the success of entry, if they do not affect the credibility of
the venture.   By subsidizing production, government can affect the outcome of the competitive
game in such a way as to shift rents in favour of the domestic firms (see Brander and Spencer,
1985).   As indicated above, public support to Airbus has taken mostly the form of a reduction8
in fixed, development cost and has not affected variable production costs to an appreciable
extent.   This aspect will thus be neglected in the present analysis.     
This paper reports the results of a model whose purpose is to estimate the impact that
Airbus's presence has had on the market for large commercial airliners.  In doing so we want to
ask what have been the costs and benefits of the decision to set up the consortium.  This
exercise highlights the consequences of European public support to Airbus only to the extent
that in the absence of government support, the Airbus project would not have flown at all. 
Indeed we do not model the way in which government support has added to the credibility of
the project and what would have happened without support (the Airbus project might have
survived, but in a very different form).  The implicit assumption behind our policy conclusions
is therefore that government support has been decisive for the very existence of the project.
Besides addressing specific question about industrial policy in the airframe industry,
this paper also tries to draw some more general lessons about the appropriate conduct of
industrial policy by governments. Although it is only proper to be cautious about drawing
general lessons from a very particular case that has been analyzed according to an even more
particular model, the aerospace industry has been used in the past to make a number of general
claims about industrial policy
2, and it is helpful at the very least to see whether we have learned
anything that casts light on these more general claims.
                                                
    2 For example, Baldwin & Krugman argue that "for those who work on the "new" trade theory
that emphasize increasing returns, dynamics and imperfect competition, these economic9
The model of the paper has a number of important features. First, it is a model of a
sequence of production decisions taken over a forty year period since the 1950s and affecting
output and sales over six decades. The aim has been to reproduce a stylized characterisation of
six main stages in the development of the large commercial airliner market (including a stage
that has not yet taken place, namely the development of replacements for the Boeing 747).
Then the model is used to ask a number of counterfactual questions about what would have
happened in a variety of circumstances (notably ones in which Airbus did not enter the
market). Secondly, we explicitly model (albeit in a highly simplified way) decisions about the
development of new models and the level of expenditure on research and development, in
order to see whether Airbus's presence has had an impact on the type and technological
specification of aircraft produced as well as on their quantity and price. Thirdly, the model is a
linear one, which means that it uses a simplified (and therefore tractable) approximation to
underlying technologies and market conditions that may be very far from linear. The reliability
of the approximation is higher for small changes around observed historical outcomes, but is
more suspect the more radical the counterfactual simulations that are run. Fourthly, reliable
data are available for only some of the parameters of the model; for others we have had to rely
on informed guesses, or calibrations that are consistent with observed history. Some of our
                                                                                                                                                                                    
characteristics would in and of themselves make aircraft a natural target for study" (1988); and
that "the presence of dynamic factors....[makes the industry] a uniquely rewarding subject for a
trial run (of new trade theories and policies)" (1987).10
simulation outcomes (those concerning outputs and, to a lesser extent, prices) are more robust
to uncertainties about these parameters than others (probably the least robust, unfortunately, are
our estimates of profits).
A number of striking conclusions nevertheless emerge from the simulations. First,
given the prior presence of McDonnell-Douglas in this market, Airbus has had only a modest
impact on the prices of commercial airliners (an average of 3.5%). The reasons are twofold:
first, although the Airbus presence constrains the actions of Boeing, it weakens the incentive
for MDD to compete vigorously with Boeing. Secondly, by reducing Boeing's market share it
prevents the realisation of the substantial economies of scale and scope (including learning
effects) that are believed to exist in this technology. Overall this means that the consumer
surplus argument for government subsidy to Airbus is only weakly supported by the model.
However, Airbus is nevertheless a more effective competitor to Boeing than is MDD, in the
sense that prices in a market with only Boeing and MDD would on average be 2% higher than
in a market with only Boeing and Airbus. This is principally because MDD produces aircraft
that have significantly higher running costs than those of Airbus. Furthermore, if MDD had not
been present in this market, a Boeing monopoly would have had dramatically higher prices (by
15% on average). So consumer surplus benefits from a challenge to Boeing have certainly been
substantial - but most of them could have been achieved by MDD on its own
3.
                                                
    3 Although MDD is a less effective competitor to Boeing than Airbus, it should not be thought
that under plausible alternative specifications of our model it might turn out to be a negligible
competitor to Boeing although still present in the market. This is because scale economies are11
Secondly, the impact of Airbus on technological innovation by other producers has
been negative
4. This is because Airbus entry has lowered their expected production runs and
thereby reduced the profitability of investment in fuel- and maintenance-efficiency. Aggregate
research and development in the industry has risen, but there has been greater duplication.
Thirdly, the Airbus presence reduces Boeing's profits by at least $100 bn. and MDD's
(which would anyway be low) by about two-thirds. Airbus itself makes profits which are
difficult to estimate with confidence, but which may lie somewhere between $40bn and $52bn,
of the order of a billion dollars per annum and equivalent to a rate of return over the whole
period of between 6% and 11%. If we give the same weight to profits and consumer surplus
this implies that Airbus has had a large negative impact on world social welfare but a
comfortably positive impact on European welfare.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
so important in this technology that, if a producer enters the market at all, it will always do so at
a scale of production that makes a significant difference to its competitors' sales.
    4 Airbus itself has of course contributed to technological progress via its own investments, but
the benefits of this should be fully reflected in the prices of its aircraft and consequently in its
profits. The externalities (which provide the rationale for public support) consist solely in the
impact on innovation by other producers. This model does not, however, measure pure
technological spillovers (such as any ability by Boeing to innovate more chaeply by copying
Airbus technology); it looks merely at the impact of competition on incentives to innovate.12
Fourthly, the simulations shed an intriguing light on the rent-stealing argument.
Although the model does not enable us to model predation (since within each production stage
producers play a static game in production capacities), it does allow us to examine the impact
of guaranteed entry by Airbus on the entry decisions of other producers. Although Airbus may
have deterred MDD from producing aircraft in the same category as the A-300 (medium range,
medium-bodied), it may in contrast have actually made it easier for MDD to produce the MD-
11 in competition with the A330/340 and the Boeing 777. This is because the loss of scale and
scope economies by Boeing as a result of the Airbus entry has substantially raised the cost to
Boeing of producing the 777, making entry more attractive for MDD even when Airbus's
presence is taken into account.
This last point has potentially important implications in a wide range of contexts
outside the particular circumstances of commercial aerospace. In simple models of entry
deterrence it is often assumed that a firm faces symmetric rivals: actions that weaken or deter
one will weaken or deter them all. When a firm's rivals are significantly asymmetric, however,
this reasoning may be importantly flawed. Actions by firm A that weaken its rival firm B may
reduce the threat it poses to firm C by enough to more than offset any threat to firm C from
firm A. Interestingly, this phenomenon has important analogies in evolutionary biology, where
the introduction of predator species into an ecosystem has been shown in certain circumstances13
to increase rather than reduce the number of other species the ecosystem can support
5; in
recognition of these analogies we can even christen it the Starfish Effect.
It is important to note that the very circumstances which give rise to the Starfish Effect
- namely the presence of large economies of scale and scope - are precisely the circumstances
which have typically been thought propitious for the rent-stealing argument. For example,
Baldwin & Flam (1989) say that "the market for 30-40 seat commercial aircraft seems to be the
near ideal real world counterpart to the Brander-Spencer model [of rent-shifting]", because "the
industry is marked by very strong static as well as dynamic economies of scale; to enter
requires a large initial investment, and marginal costs are falling substantially due to learning
by doing.  Policies that can affect capacity choices and output therefore have important effects
on costs and profits and on the distribution of profits and welfare between countries". The
model of this paper, however, suggests a more cautionary message: economies of scale and
                                                
    5 Wilson (1993), p.164 reports an experiment by Robert Paine: "The starfish Pisaster
ochraceus is a key-stone predator of mollusks living in rock-bound tidal waters, including
mussels, limpets and chitons. It also attacks barnacles...Where the Pisaster strfish occurred in
Paine's study area, fifteen... of the mollusk and barnacle species coexisted. When Paine removed
the starfish by hand, the number of species declined to eight. What occurred was unexpected but
in hindsight logical. Free of the depredations of Pisaster, mussels and barnacles increased to
abnormally high densities and crowded out seven of the other species". See the discussion of
this and related phenomena in Sigmund (1993).14
scope indeed increase the extent to which entry decisions can redistribute rents. But in the
presence of asymmetric rivals they also make it more likely that entry decisions of at least
some firms are strategic complements rather than strategic substitutes, and therefore make the
task of selective government intervention harder rather than easier.
Overall, the results of the model suggest that the external benefits from the entry of
Airbus into the market, though positive, have been modest. This suggests that government
support for the Airbus consortium will have been justified primarily if it proves to have been
profitable, and there is at least a reasonable chance that it will so prove.
2. The Market for Jet Airframes: a historical sketch
The commercial aircraft industry is characterised by unusually large static and dynamic scale
 economies as well scope economies and it has been subject to significant demand and
technological shocks since the second world war. 
To start with,  development cost give rise to significant scale economies and these costs are
rising : development costs for the Boeing 777,  which is now entering  service, could be as
much as 4.3 (according to Tyson, 1992).  On a cost per seat basis, development costs for this
aircraft have increased substantially relative to those incurred for the 747 in the early 70s.  
With such initial outlays, fixed cost per unit are about halved when output is doubled from
an initial level of 200 units.  Even at the scale of  500 units,  a 50 % increase in output still
leads to a drop in average development costs of about 33 %.    However large, fixed cost do15
however play a relatively minor role by comparison with  variable cost in generating scale
economies (for instance, at a production level of 500 units,  average fixed cost do not
typically account for more 10 % of overall (fixed and variable average costs).  
Indeed, most of the dynamics of costs is associated with variable costs (as much as 90 %
according to Klepper, 1990) ; the production of aircafts involves the coordination of
thousands of tasks and this process can be improved as experience accumulates.  Such
learning by doing leads to important dynamic scale economies.  The basic rule of thumb
used in the industry is that production costs decrease by 20% when output doubles (within
realistic production ranges). 
Basic aircraft design can also sometimes be shared across a number of different models;
experience gained in production processes can also to some extent be applied to different
production lines.  As a result,  significant economies of scope can arise, and the more so, the
closer are the aircafts in terms of basic characteristics (fuselage size, wing span, type of
fitted engines).  For instance,  there is much commonality between the Airbus A330 and A
340.  The Airbus A 330 is shorter than the A 340 but their fuselage has a common central
section and they share the same wings (except for engine pots - as the A430 has four engines
and A330 has only two).   By contrast,  the importance of  scope economies between the A
330/340 family and the A320 (a much smaller aircraft) is much reduced.  It is basically
associated with some avionics initially developed for the A320 which has been further
developed and adapted for the A330/340 family.16
Overall, these costs characteristics are such that if the industry is analysed purely in terms of
static productive efficiency, it is at best a natural oligopoly (allowing for managerial
diseconomies), and possibly a natural monopoly (as claimed, for instance by Tyson, 1992).  
 According to Sutton (1995), the characteristics of technological improvements in this
industry provide a second additional reason behind high concentration.   He suggests that
research and development on existing models is sometimes such that advanced versions can
effectively dominate particular segments.   According to his analysis,  a successful aircraft
design is therefore one that can be developed later in the lifetime of the aircraft into a
product that vertically dominates competitors.  Such successful design experience two large
peaks in sales, one when the aircraft is launched and one when the advanced version comes
on sales.   By contrast, unsuccessful design experience only one peak in sales (when it is
launched) and the market becomes eventually dominates by the successful design. 
The first major development in the industry was triggered by the invention of the jet engine
and its application to civil aircraft. The first civil jet aircraft, the Comet (designed and
produced in Britain), flew in 1949 and entered service in 1952.    Relative to previous piston
engines,  jet engines allowed for much superior performance (in terms of speed and range)
but involved much larger fixed development costs.  This change in cost structure inevitably
led to consolidation in an industry characterised by a larger number of independent
producers.    The European industry was fragmented (including Hawker Siddely,  Vickers, de
Havilland,  Sud aviation, British Aircraft Corporation and Fokker) and its first mover, de
Havilland with the Comet, was grounded for several years because of technical problems.    
In the meantime, both Douglas and Boeing developed their commercial aircrafts (the DC 817
and 707, respectively) and managed, because of  a larger domestic market, to establish
themselves quickly and reap the necessary scale economies
6.  By the early sixties, the
European industry, victim of small national market and fragmented supply had all but
disappeared.
The basic design for the 707 and DC8 were soon developed to meet the  diversified 
domestic need of American airlines; first, the 727 was developed as a three engine version of
the 707, which could fly across the US.  In order to meet the demand for short inter-city
links,  Douglas produced the DC 9 by scaling down the DC8 and the 707 was further
reduced by Boeing, to produce the 737 (with two engines).       This is the first important
product development in the industry, after the basic jet design were produced and it is
modelled as stage A in our simulation.   Because of financial difficulties, Douglas also
merged with Mc Donnell (a company specialising in military procurement) at this time.
By the end of the 60s, the industry was affected by a new development in engine technology.
 The turbo-fan technology, invented by Rolls-Royce,  had the potential for much greater
thrust than the traditional turbo-jet technology.  Such increase in power meant that much
larger aircraft could be flown and that the number of engines could be reduced for existing
                                                
6 Both the DC8 and 707 were derived from military projects (the (in)famous B47/B52 in the
case of  Boeing)  financed by the pentagon. 18
any aircraft sizes.  This, in turn, could allow for significant savings in fuel
7.   The US
government then financed competing developments for a large scale transport aircraft by
Boeing and Mc Donnell Douglas and Lockheed.   All three decided to develop commercial
applications.  Mac Donnell Douglas and Lockheed designed tri-jets aircrafts (respectively
the DC 10 and the L1011 with similar range and capacity (350 passengers over 5 500
nautical miles).   Boeing decided to leapfrog competition and designed a significantly larger
aeroplane (more than 400 passengers and more than 6000 nautical miles) with four engines. 
This is the second major product development in the industry (modelled as stage B).   
Lockheed eventually won the contract for the military transport aircraft and retreated from
the commercial market (after having incurred substantial losses).  
By producing tri-jets with a capacity of 350 passengers, Lockheed and Mc Donnell Douglas
had however left what became known in the industry as a "hole in the sky".   American
airlines wanted a 250 seat (wide body) aircraft that could fly across the US and save on fuel.
  European airlines wanted an aircraft of similar size and range for some of their dense intra-
European routes.   The Airbus first responded by designing the A300 and its derivatives the
A310, with an extended range and smaller capacity.  Soon after, Boeing proposed the 757,
an extended version of the 737 as a stopgap measure
8.  However, as narrow body jet, the 757
                                                
7 In addition, turbo fans are much quieter than turbo jets as the core of the engine is
surrounded by a large flow of air.
8 According to industry analysts, the aircraft was designed to meet the particular needs of
British Airways in  order to ensure that it would not defect to Airbus.19
had insufficient capacity and could not be extended further.  Boeing then developed the 767,
an entirely new design, which competed head on with the A300/A310.   This is the third
major product development  in the industry (modelled as stage C).
The deregulation of  the American airlines industry and the development of air transport in
Europe gave rise to a new development;  a short to medium range aircraft with a seating
capacity of about 150 was needed to support feeding into hubs in the US and to connect
capitals in Europe.  Airbus moved first by developing the A320, fitted with many advanced
technological features like the fly by wire technology.   This strategy was meant to
differentiate Airbus offering from that of Boeing and Mc Donnell Douglas, which both
developed new versions of existing aircrafts.  Boeing developed the 737-300 (and later the
737-400) arguing that a much superior aircraft could soon be designed after new
developments in engine technology (the prop-fan) would materialise
9.  Mc Donnell Douglas
produced the MD 80, a derivative of the DC9.   This is the fourth major product
development in the industry (stage D).
By the mid eighties, it became apparent that the DC 10 was becoming technologically
obsolete and that the 747 was used sometimes inefficiently.  It was used on short term / high
density routes for which it had inadequate aerodynamic characteristics  and long but 
medium density flights (where the load factor was not inefficiently low).   In addition, some
very long distances (Europe-Australia) could not be covered (at full load) without a stop-
                                                
9 Despite high intial hopes, this technology has been abandonned.20
over.   Airbus responded by producing the A330/A340 family.  The A330 has two engines
and seats about 370 over 5000 miles, whereas the A340 has four engines and can cover more
than 7 000 miles (with a slightly reduced capacity).  Boeing waited two years longer than
Airbus before designing a competing aircraft, the 777, which is somewhere in between the 
A330 and A340.  This delay may however prove crucial to the extent that the 777
incorporates the latest advances in engine technology such that it can come close the
performance of the A340 with only two engines.   This stage of competition is currently
taking place and it is modelled as stage E.
Despite major improvements over the last twenty years, the 747 is now ageing and industry
analysts anticipate that the next major product introduction will occur in that segment.  
Airbus is already talking about a potential A350 (600 seats ? ) and Boeing has unveiled plans
for a 800 seat aircraft (a double decker over the whole length of the aircraft).  Is it unclear
however whether the market for such large aircrafts will materialise (see FT, April 3, 1995);
at this point, there are few interested airlines (British Airways and Singapore Airlines) but
much will depend on the development of airport facilities (restrictions to further airport
construction tend to favour mega aircrafts) and air traffic control (the safety distance
between large aircrafts is significantly shorter than that between small ones).    This is the
last stage of competition in our model (stage F).
The main characteristics (in terms of range and single class seating) of the aircrafts produced
at these various stages of competition are presented in figure 1.   The various market
segments associated with these product designed are also broadly presented;  in the course of21
the 35 years of history that we model, two decisions will be taken in  the short range-narrow
body segment (DC9/737-100 and later the MD80, 737-300 and A320), one decision in the
medium range-medium body segment (the 757/767 and A300/310), one decision in the long
range-medium body (the A330/340, MD11 and 777) and two decisions in the long range-
wide body (747, DC10 and 747 replacement).
In order to illustrate further the developments that our basic model will account for, table 1
also presents the cumulated sales of the various aircrafts produced at these various stages of
competition.
Table 1.  Cumulated deliveries - 1952-1993
Short range-narrow body

















3. Previous studies of Airbus
Our model examines the impact of the entry of a third producer into the market for
large civilian passenger aircraft.  Two items of previous research have modelled competition
purely as a duopoly between Boeing and Airbus. Both have claimed that the presence of Airbus
in this market has had overall negative consequences, both from the point of view of the world
as a whole and from the narrower point of view of European shareholders, consumers and
taxpayers. Baldwin & Krugman (1988) model competition in one market segment, between the
Airbus A300 and the Boeing 767. They estimate that the entry of Airbus resulted in substantial
consumer gains, but large losses of profits to Boeing and smaller but still substantial costs to
European taxpayers. The United States suffered as a whole from the policy, and Europe
suffered in aggregate for all but discount rates of 3% or less. The negative impact of Airbus
entry is due to the presence of substantial learning economies
10 which are diluted by the
presence of competition.
                                                
    10 By learning economies are meant reductions in marginal costs of production as production
runs increase.23
Klepper (1990) extends this analysis by modelling competition between two producers
in three segments: short-range narrow body aircraft, medium-range medium body aircraft and
long-range wide body aircraft.  His main conclusion confirms that of Baldwin & Krugman,
namely that the competitive benefits of Airbus entry are swamped by the loss of learning
economies; the effect is even stronger in his model due to the presence of significant scope
economies
11 between segments.  Klepper (1994) also considers the impact that production
subsidies for Airbus would have on the outcome of competition and welfare.  He finds that a
20 % subsidy would increase Airbus’s market share in all segments to 50-60%, while leaving
consumers relatively unaffected.   The main effect of  production subsidies is to transfer
learning (and profits) from Boeing to Airbus.  As indicated above, we neglect production
subsidies in the present analysis as they account for small share of the overall public support to
Airbus. 
The present model differs from the previous work in two main ways:
1) We include three producers in the model. Our results indicate that the impact of
a third producer is qualitatively and quantitatively very different from that of a second.
                                                
    11 Scope economies occur when marginal costs of production in one segment fall as production
runs in a different segment increase. This is due to the transferability of some production
methods between different models in a manufacturer's range.24
2) We model the decision to develop new products rather than treating
manufacturers' product ranges as given. This enables us to ask whether Airbus entry had an
effect on its rivals' product range and quality as well as on the prices and output of given
products. In addition we divide the market into four main segments.
The price of complicating the model in this way has been our adoption of a linear
specification for demand and production technology, as well as the assumption that producers
act as Cournot competitors (taking each others' capacity as given); together these
simplifications enable analytical solutions to be found to the game between producers at each
stage.
4. The model: a brief description
Our model (details of which are given in Appendix 1) describes a stylised history of the
market for large passenger aircraft since the 1960s as a sequence of six stages in the
development of four market segments. These four segments are:
1) Short-range, narrow bodied (SRNB)
2) Medium range, medium bodied (MRMB)
3) Long-range, medium bodied (LRMB)
4) Long-range wide bodied (LRWB)25
The six stages of competition are:
A)  (early  1960s): The players decide whether to enter SRNB [this corresponds to the
decision by Boeing to produce the 727 and 737, and by MDD to
produce the DC-9]
B) (late 1960s): LRWB [Boeing 747, MDD DC-10]
C) (1970s): MRMB [Airbus 300,310, B 757,767]
D) (early 1980s): SRNB [Airbus 320, B 737, MD-80]
E) (late 1980s): LRMB [A-330,340, B 777, MD-11]
F) (late 1990s): LRWB [replacements for the 747?]
The order in which these six decision stages occur is a given feature of the model; we
do not claim to show why they occur in this order. At each stage we model the three
manufacturers (Airbus, Boeing and MDD) as taking simultaneous decisions whether or not to
enter the relevant market segment, and if so what level of development costs to incur, in the
knowledge that they will subsequently compete in production capacities with whichever other
producers also enter. In taking its decision each manufacturer knows what has occurred at
previous stages and foresees what will happen in future stages; it decides its production
capacity for the lifetime of the aircraft taking as given the production capacity installed by its
rivals and its own past and future production capacity in other market segments. Development
takes five years and production continues for a further twenty-five. All producers are assumed
to maximise profits, both in their development decisions and in deciding how much production
capacity to install.26
These assumptions about taking capacity as fixed require further comment. They fall
into three categories. First, there is the assumption that a single producer's capacity, once
installed, cannot be changed. This is clearly very unrealistic when we consider that production
in practice continues for 20-25 years for most aircraft models. It may, however, be an adequate
approximation to a more realistic situation in which changing production capacity is
sufficiently expensive to outweigh any likely strategic advantage of changing it once it has
been installed. A producer will not wish to make a unilateral change in installed capacity unless
this would induce some favourable reaction from a competitor (otherwise this level of capacity
would not have been optimal in the first place); our assumption implies that the prospects of
any such reaction are not great enough to outweigh the costs of a change. We have made this
assumption because to do otherwise would greatly complicate the model, which in its six-stage
form is already complicated enough at least for our taste. However, one extension seems to us
potentially well worth exploring, though we cannot do so in this paper. This would be to take
seriously the idea that aircraft sales at a given production stage typically follow a twin-peaked
pattern. One way to model this would be to suppose that capacity can be changed half-way
through a production run, and an aircraft's technical specifications can be upgraded, in response
to new information that has been revealed about market conditions. To model this would
involve, in addition to a doubling of the number of decisions about production capacity, a
satisfactory modelling of uncertainty and its resolution.
The second assumption worth commenting upon is the assumption that intertemporal
pricing issues (within segments) can be ignored.   A number of  different constraints will27
affect the intertemporal pricing of aircrafts.   To the extent that airlines prefer to
homogenous fleets to reduce maintenance costs and the training of the crew, manufacturers
may have an incentive to undertake some "penetration" pricing.   The incentive to price
aggressively in the early stages of sales because of such network effect among consumers
will also be exacerbated by competition (see Matutes and Regibeau (1995) on competing
standards).  
To the extent that aircrafts are durable, the manufacturers may also have an incentive to
discriminate across buyers over time (initially selling to those airlines with a high
willingness to pay and progressively reducing price along the demand curve).   As is well
know, such price discrimination is difficult when buyers anticipate the strategy and decide to
wait.   As conjectured by Coase (and shown by Stokey, 1981),  a monopolist trying to
discriminate across discrete time periods would lose all market power as the time periods
become arbitrarily shorter.    There are however several ways in which the monopolist can
mitigate his loss of market power; any device that will commit him not flood the market at
later stages will give buyer the appropriate incentive to buy early.  As emphasized by Bulow
(1982), if the monopolist can rent the services of the durables rather than sell them, he will
be better off.  Indeed, by renting the durables the monopolist will have an incentive to
maintain the value of  the existing stock of goods and hence will  avoid flooding the market.
   A commitment to a fixed capacity will be equally effective.  As suggested by Bulow
(1982, p 326),  in the presence of repeat buying, firms will have an incentive to establish a
reputation for protecting the assets of their customers and hence should be able to commit to
pricing strategies which do not involve sharply decreasing prices over time.   28
These various commitment devices seem to be present in the commercial aircraft
industry; both Boeing and Airbus undertake some leasing (even thought the largest share of
leasing in undertaken by third agents),  changes in capacity are very costly and the game is
repeated.  Aircraft manufacturers are therefore likely to retain substantial market power and
should be able to undertake some intertemporal discrimination.    Given the other constraints
mentioned above (involving network effects), it is unclear however what will be the shape of
the intertemporal price structure.  An indeed, there is some evidence (Klepper, 1990) that
aircraft remain constant over time.    For the sake of this analysis,  we thus simply assume
that prices are kept constant (in real terms) over the life time of the aircraft.
The third assumption worth commenting upon is the assumption that producers take
their own and others' future capacity at other stages as given when choosing their level of
capacity today. What this rules out is the possibility that producers may choose their capacity
today in order to influence decisions made by themselves or other producers in the future (as
we explain below, we do indeed take into account the strategic motive for entry decisions, but
not the strategic motive for capacity decisions conditional upon entry). Our justification for
treating the impact of strategic motives as small enough to ignore is based on two types of
consideration.  First, regarding producers own decisions in the future, we can appeal to the
envelope theorem.  A marginal increase  in output today in order to influence the marginal
calculations determining the level of a producer's own output in a future period is small enough29
to ignore
12.  We cannot however appeal to the envelope theorem  to ignore the impact of
producers decisions on those of competitors in the future.  However, ignoring the impact on a
competitor's output relies more on what might be called the « back-of-the-envelope
theorem », according to which strategic effect can be ignored when they are likely to be very
small, and when the cost of taking them explicitly into account is large ; there are two strategic
effects of output decisions that would add enormously to the current model's complexity. One
is that an increase in output beyond the level that would otherwise be profit-maximising
changes a rival's optimal choice of output in other market segments in ways that make a non-
marginal difference to the decision-maker's profits.  Making this explicit would require us to
solve an 18 by 18 system of equations rather than a series of 3 by 3 systems, a great increase in
complication for what our ad hoc sensitivity analysis (as we report in section 6 below) suggests
is likely to be a small increase in accuracy. Secondly, a large increase in output beyond the
non-strategic level might induce a discontinuous change (such as the exit of a competitor)
whose effect would be to raise profits of the decision-maker above the non-strategic profit-
maximising level. By their very nature such effects cannot be taken into account by finding the
first-order conditions for profit-maximisation (which is what enables us to find analytic
solutions to the capacity game at each stage). Instead they must be discovered by a simulation
methodology that searches over all possible capacity levels (taking into account all competitors'
                                                
    12 Of course, there may be a significant inducement to increase output today in order to benefit
from reductions (via scope or learning economies) in the costs of producing the intra-marginal
units of output which it is expected will be produced in the future, but this is fully taken into
account in our model.30
best responses to these output levels) to see whether any discontinuous future entry decisions
may be influenced by them in a manner favourable to the decision-maker. This would make
solving the model very considerably more complicated than it is at present, so we have not
undertaken this task. Our model is best described as representing a fully strategic game in entry
decisions, given that producers know that if they enter a market they will be setting capacity
non-strategically
13. However, after presenting the simulation results we discuss whether and to
what extent our findings may be sensitive to this assumption.
The model's specification of both demand and technology is linear, enabling us to find
analytical solutions to the system of equations describing the choice of production capacity at
each stage.
Demand for aircraft in one segment is a function not just of the prices of aircraft in that
segment but also of prices of those in neighbouring segments. Within each segment aircraft are
assumed to be differentiated solely by fuel and maintenance costs; that is, aircraft within each
segment are deemed perfect substitutes if they have the same fuel and maintenance costs
(adjusted for numbers of seats).    Accordingly, we do not allow for national biases in demand,
which would also require modelling regional markets.  This assumption may be questionable,
in particular for the US.  As indicated in 1, which reports on regional markets shares, it appears
                                                
    13 Technically, therefore, we are solving for a sub-game perfect equilibrium of an entry game
whose payoffs are determined at each stage by the Nash equilibrium of a one-shot game in
capacities.31
that US producers have a relatively high market shares in their domestic markets, relative to
that obtained outside US and Europe (the ROW).  By contrast, Airbus obtains market shares in
Europe which are closer  to those observed in the ROW.  Such distribution of sales is
consistent with the view that European airlines buy aircraft mostly on merits whereas US
airlines may be biased towards their domestic suppliers.
Table 1.  Regional market shares of airbus products
Europe US ROW
Narrow body-short range 31 % 22% 29%
Medium body-long range 53% 33% 46%
Medium body-medium range 44% 15% 48%
The costs of production embody scale economies both in the form of fixed
development costs and in the form of marginal costs that decline with the level of output.
There is also a learning effect embodied in the fact that a producer's marginal costs are lower
for a given market segment if it has produced an earlier model within that segment
14. Finally,
                                                
    14 Our calculation of the profit-maximising capacity decisions at each stage do not take
account of the effect that a marginal increase in output today in a given market segment may
have on the marginal costs of producing output in the same market segment when this
generation's aircraft are replaced in twenty-five years' time. This is partly because of the length32
there are economies of scope in the form of marginal costs that decline with the level of output
produced in neighbouring segments.
The model is solved backwards. This means basically that the solution at each stage is
constrained by the requirement that predictions about the future must be consistent with
rational behaviour by all parties when those predictions are realised. What this implies is that
the model must not assume that producers were incapable of foreseeing developments which
the model itself predicts.
The steps involved in finding a solution are as follows. They consist of finding the
Nash equilibria consistent with a set of historical production data, and then checking to see
which of these Nash equilibria are sub-game perfect:
1) Parameter values are chosen for the whole model.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of time ahead (the average impact on the next generation's marginal costs takes place 37.5 years
from the present, which becomes negligible with even mild discounting). It is also because to do
so would introduce an arbitrary asymmetry between the calculation for our first two stages of
competition (A and B) where replacements are foreseen within our finite-horizon model, and
the remaining stages where it is not, although such replacement will almost certainly take place.33
2) Using historical data about production in previous stages, the model calculates
the profit-maximising output in stage F under each combination of decisions by the three
players to enter the market or to stay out.
3) For each such combination it determines whether each of the parties would
make more profits by changing its entry decision
15. If so, the combination is rejected as a non-
equilibrium. Any combinations that survive this test are listed as solutions. In principle there
might be multiple solutions: for instance, it might turn out to be profitable for only one
producer to enter a particular market segment, but for any of the three to able to do so as long
as the others stayed out. However, for our base run and all simulations only a single
combination of decisions has turned out to constitute a solution at each stage of the model.
4) The output values predicted for each producer by the solution to stage F are
used as parameters for the solution to stage E (stage E involves entry into a neighbouring
segment to that entered at stage F, so there are economies of scope as well as cross-elasticity
                                                
    15 In the results we report producers do not discount future profits in making these entry
decisions. The reason for this is that under no reasonable calibration is MDD making a
comnmercial rate of return in the base run, so that to model the entry decisions as properly
discounted would make it difficult to calibrate the model consistently with MDD's presence in
the market. We have, nevertheless, compared our results with what would occur if proper
discounting were used and MDD were assumed to face counterfactually low fixed costs in the
base run; the qualitative results are very similar.34
effects to take into consideration). We solve for an equilibrium at stage E taking as given the
predicted result at stage F as well as the historical values of output in stages A to D.
5) The procedure is repeated analogously for the other stages back to stage A.
6) We then check whether, at any stage, the equilibrium entry decision of any
producer would be different if, instead of historical output data, the equilibrium were
calculated using the outputs that would have been chosen if some producer X at an earlier stage
had made a non-equilibrium entry decision
16. If so, we compare the total profits for producer X
under the two historical sequences and choose as the solution to the model the one that yields
the highest total profits.
We use the term "run" of the model to refer to a carrying out of steps 1) to 6) for a
given set of parameter values.
Each run of the model takes the characteristics (namely development and operating
costs) of aircraft types as given. However, it also calculates the optimal investment by each
manufacturer in product characteristics. For the base run the parameters of the function
determining investment levels are chosen so that manufacturers' historical investment levels
are the optimal ones given the output levels they produced. When running simulations under
                                                
    16 Technically this amounts to ensuring that entry decisions at later stages are defined as
functions of earlier decisions.35
alternative hypotheses, changes in outputs by the manufacturers are likely to alter the return to
investment in product characteristics and so change both the optimal level of investment and
the aircraft running costs that would result. Ensuring complete consistency between the
parameters of a run and their optimal values would require prohibitive computational resources
for comparatively little benefit. So in order to ensure approximate consistency the procedure
we have adopted is as follows. A simulation is run using the same parameters as the base case.
This generates a number of results including output levels and optimal investment levels,
which may be significantly different from historical levels of these variables that have been
used as parameters for the simulations. We therefore run a second simulation using among its
parameters the relevant variables generated by the first run. In the simulations we have
reported, the results of the second run are very similar to those of the first run, suggesting that
further attempts at convergence are unnecessary. This means that our results can be interpreted
as showing the impact of various alternative scenarios not just on physical volumes of output
produced but also on the quality of aircraft developed.
At two points in the model (stages D and F) at least one manufacturer is faced with a
choice between continuing to produce an existing model and producing a new or upgraded
model. Here our procedure has been to run a simulation under each of the two alternatives and
to compare the profits to the manufacturer in each outcome, reporting the more profitable
solution.
4. Results36
In this section we report a comparison between prices and outputs at each stage of
development under various alternative hypotheses. First we report a "base run", which attempts
to reproduce fairly closely the history of the passenger aircraft market since the 1960s, and
reasonable current estimates of future demand. According to this base run, both Boeing and
MDD enter the SRNB and LRWB segments; Airbus and Boeing both produce MRMB aircraft
though MDD stays out; and all three producers enter the LRMB segment. We have also
conjectured that Airbus and Boeing (though not MDD) will decide to produce new LRWB
aircraft in the late 1990s. One important feature to note about the base case is that both Boeing
and MDD are assumed to foresee the later entry of Airbus even when making their initial
decision at stage A. This has the effect of making them produce slightly lower output since
they foresee that Airbus's presence will make it harder in the future to exploit economies of
scope between different models.
Appendix 2 reports the procedure we have used in calibrating those parameters of the
model about which we do not have direct data. To give some idea of the sensitivity of the
results to alternative values of the parameters, Table 3 shows two alternative base runs which
differ in respect of perhaps the hardest parameters to calibrate with confidence, namely
elasticities of demand. In principle elasticities are determined jointly by three variables: price,
output and the ratio of marginal cost to price at the equilibrium output. The former two are
given by historical data or forecasts, and the last is thought to lie somewhat below 60% (this is
a kind of stylised fact about which there is a rough industry consensus). However, because of
uncertainty about this last value we have calibrated a second base run with elasticities about37
20% (in absolute value) higher than those given in the first. Subsequent tables will report the
figures based on the lower elasticities, because these are the ones that approximate better to the
consensus value of the price-marginal cost ratio; but the sensitivity of results to alternative
assumptions should be borne in mind. The most immediate impact of higher elasticities is to
lower the profitability of all producers: that of Airbus falls from 8% to 6%, and MDD barely
makes a positive rate of return. But in addition the effect of Airbus is weaker under high
elasticities; the percentage change in prices is roughly halved, and if induced quality changes
are taken into account the consumer surplus benefits of Airbus entry become negligibly small.38
Table 3
Comparison of two base runs: high and low demand elasticities
Elasticities of demand High Low
Airbus rate of return  6%  8%
Boeing rate of return 23% 27%
MDD rate of return  1.1%  2.8%
Simulation without Airbus; effect on:
Prices unadjusted for quality 1.9% 3.8%
Prices adjusted for quality 0.1% 2.1%
Prices unadjusted (last 4 stages) 3.2% 5.8%
Prices adjusted (last 4 stages) 0.7% 3.5%
Consumer surplus unadjusted ($bn.) -18 -36
Consumer surplus adjusted ($bn.) -0.5 -20
Consumer surplus unadj. (last 4) -22 -39
Consumer surplus adj. (last 4) -5 -23
Boeing profits ($bn.) 151.5 103.3
MDD profits ($bn.)   8.5  23.939
A number of comments about the profitability calculations are in order. First, by "rate
of return" we mean the internal rate of return of the stream of revenues and costs accruing to
developing and manufacturing airframes in the four segments of the model; this is not the same
as the rate of return of the manufacturer on its capital employed, since the manufacturer will
typically have pre-existing overhead capital investments in addition to the development
expenditures incurred in respect of particular airliners. Secondly, with respect to Airbus we
have nevertheless sought to impute an capital cost to the development of its first aircraft which
can be thought of as the cost of setting up an aerospace operation over and above the cost to an
established operation of developing a new model. We have been extremely conservative in
this; a lower imputed capital cost, allied to lower elasticities, might raise Airbus's rate of return
to something like 11%, while lower capital costs in the presence of higher elasticities imply a
rate of return around 9%. Thirdly, we have assumed that manufacturers' revenues accrue at a
constant rate throughout the lifetime of each model; in practice this may overstate rates of
return since it does not allow for slow initial sales of new models. Finally, all of these estimates
are dependent on the forecasts of future demand and prices that have been used. More
pessimistic forecasts might significantly lower the rate of return to all producers including
Airbus. This is particularly important to bear in mind in the case of Airbus since most of its
profits in the base run occur after the mid-1990s. Figure 2 illustrates; it is worth noting for
comparison that the internal rate of return of Airbus's profit stream up to the mid-1990s is only
0.7%, even under the low elasticities assumption. Overall, we must stress that rates of return
are purely illustrative and should not be considered as forecasts.
       Table 4 reports aircraft prices under different alternative assumptions in addition to those40
of the (low elasticity) base run. We have chosen to report the low elasticity simulations because
the overall findings of the paper (that the impact of Airbus on prices is small but its effect on
industry profits is large) emerges even more strongly from the high elasticity simulations, and
we have preferred not to allow the mere choice of simulations to give added strength to
conclusions that are already quite striking. First we report the result of a simulation in which
Airbus never enters the market, then one in which MDD never enters, and finally one in which
Boeing remains a monopoly throughout the period. All prices are in millions of 1994 dollars,
rounded to the nearest million. They do not take into account the fact that aircraft may have
different operating costs in the simulations from those in the base run, a qualification that is
explored more fully in Table 7.
Table 4
Aircraft prices $m
Stage/segment Base Run No Airbus No MDD Boeing 
Monopoly
A SRNB  33  32 36 35
(1960s)
B LRWB 127 127 138 138
(1960s)
C MRMB  66  69 65 74
(1970s)
D SRNB  29  32 32 4041
(1980s)
E LRMB 102 113 106 114
(1980s)
F LRWB 125 126 125 143
(1990s)




Stage/segment Base Run No Airbus No MDD Boeing 
Monopoly
A SRNB 3627 3806 3265 3540
(1960s)
B LRWB 1296 1308 1152 1161
(1960s)
C MRMB 2841 2709 2947 2586
(1970s)
D SRNB 6021 5675 5594 4499
(1980s)
E LRMB 1236 1086 1189 1101
(1980s)
F LRWB 1507 1507 1512 128042
(1990s)
Table 6 overleaf shows the percentage changes in prices under the different
simulations, unadjusted for quality differences (which are shown in Table 7). Note that the
absence of Airbus actually lowers prices in Stage A, even though Airbus does not enter in
Stage A in the base run.   This is because Boeing anticipates a higher output in a neighbouring
segment (the medium body, medium range segment at stage C); because of larger spillovers
across segments, Boeing has therefore a  stronger incentive to expand output at stage A.  
However, once Airbus actually enters the market (from Stage C onwards) it has an
unambiguously downward impact on prices.
Note also that the absence of MDD lowers prices in the MRMB segment (in which
MDD has no presence in the base run). This is because MDD's absence from the two
neighbouring segments enables the other producers to realise more economies of scope and so
lower prices.
The absence of Airbus in almost all cases results in the other manufacturers making
higher investments in operating efficiency. This is because the return to such investments rises
as the manufacturers are able to realise savings in operating costs over a higher level of output.
However, Airbus's absence also deprives consumers of access to Airbus's aircraft, which have
lower fuel and maintenance costs than MDD's, so not all customers purchase more fuel-
efficient aircraft in the absence of Airbus.43
Table 6
Changes in Aircraft prices compared to Base Run
Unadjusted for quality
Stage/segment No Airbus No MDD Boeing 
Monopoly
A SRNB -  3% + 7% + 4%
(1960s)
B LRWB  0 +  9% + 9%
(1960s)
C MRMB +  5% -  2% + 12%
(1970s)
D SRNB + 8% + 9% + 36%
(1980s)
E LRMB + 11% +  3% + 11%
(1980s)
F LRWB +  1% 0 + 15%
(1990s)44
Table 7
Changes in Aircraft prices compared to Base Run
Adjusted for quality
Stage/segment No Airbus No MDD Boeing 
Monopoly
A SRNB - 3% + 7% +  3%
(1960s)
B LRWB   0 + 7% +  7%
(1960s)
C MRMB + 3% - 2% + 10%
(1970s)
D SRNB + 8% + 9% + 35%
(1980s)
E LRMB + 3% + 1% +  3%
(1980s)
F LRWB + 1%   0 + 11%
(1990s)45
Full details (including results and parameter values) of the base run and No Airbus
simulation are given in Appendix 4. Three features of the simulation in particular are worth
noting:
1) The absence of Airbus encourages MDD to enter segment 2 with a direct
competitor to the Boeing 737.
2) The absence of Airbus discourages MDD from producing the MD-11. This is
because Boeing can now reap sufficient scale economies to be able to price the 777 at a level
against which MDD is unable to compete. Note that this is the contrary to the view expressed
in the mid-1980s that entry by Airbus would discourage entry by MDD (see Vickers, 1985, and
the various arguments in Dixit & Kyle, 1985 and Geroski & Jacquemin, 1985). This view
proved to be mistaken, and the current model suggest why. Airbus's entry actually made life
easier for MDD because its sales reduced Boeing's economies of scale.
3) The base run has Airbus deciding in the late 1990s to produce a direct
competitor to the 747. Obviously this is dependent on precise demand projections. Given the
ones we have used, Airbus entry would keep MDD out of this segment.
5. Implications for benefits to consumers and producers46
The prices and outputs reported in the simulations can be used to calculated changes in
aggregate consumer surplus
17 (this means overall benefits to airlines, and it is a further question
to what extent such benefits might be passed on to passengers). For the No Airbus case these
amount to approximately a reduction of $36 bn, or a reduction of $20 bn if quality differences
are taken into account
18. For the Boeing monopoly case they amount to a reduction of just over
$118 bn (quality-adjusted). For comparison, without Airbus total profits in the industry would
be some $68 billion higher over the whole 60-year period, and under a Boeing monopoly they
would be $290 billion higher.
The reason why Airbus does not have a larger impact on prices is that the pro-
competitive effects of entry are offset by a weakening of the competitive pressure from MDD,
and reduced learning economies for both existing manufacturers (especially Boeing). Our
                                                
    17 These are measured as the area of the trapezium in a demand-supply diagram bounded by
the demand curve and the two price lines (before and after the change). Since demand curves
are linear in this model this area can be measured precisely.
    18 If one includes only the impact on consumer benefits in those segments in which Airbus has
a presence, the figure for the consumer benefits due to Airbus entry is $26 bn instead of $20 bn.
This is because the model assumes that other producers produced less at stages A and B in
anticipation of Airbus's entry. This assumption may be thought unrealistically strong, in which
case the figure of $26 bn may be a more appropriate one. However, it should be noted that under
the high elasticities assumption this could fall to as low as $5 bn.47
estimates of these effects are obviously dependent on the parameter values chosen, but we have
endeavoured to use a realistic value in the light of the industry consensus.
One final question we can use to model to answer is what would have been the
consequences of a "wrong" decision by Airbus. In the base run entry by Airbus in the late
1960s with a rival to the Boeing 747 would be unprofitable. But suppose European
governments had picked a loser? How bad would it have been? The answer is that the decision
would have resulted in losses of about $3.5 billion, sufficient to bring Airbus's overall rate of
return over the whole period down from 8% to 6%. The impact on the overall market would
have been negligible, since in that event (according to our simulations) MDD would not have
developed the DC-10, and the two events would to all intents and purposes have cancelled
each other out. So it would have been regrettable but scarcely a disaster. This is worth bearing
in mind in the light of claims that failed government support can be very costly. For example,
Helpman & Krugman (1989) write: "It is possible to believe that imperfect competition is
pervasive while at the same time believing that the imperfections associated with it are fairly
modest and the gains from optimal deviations from free trade small.  Again, the quantitative
work reported in chapter 8 seems to confirm this.  One can always do better than free trade, but
the optimal tariff or subsidies seem to be small, the potential gains tiny, and there is plenty of
room for policy errors that may lead to eventual losses rather than gains". What the present
model suggests is that losses resulting from failures of strategic trade policy, while certainly
counting as losses, may also be quite small. Strategic trade policy may sometimes be both less
effective than its friends would hope and less dangerous (from a narrow nationalistic48
perspective) than its enemies fear. In this model the entry of Airbus is bad for the world as a
whole, but not particularly dangerous for its backers in Europe.
6. How robust are the findings?
Two qualitative findings emerge very clearly from our model under any reasonable
variation or re-calibration that respects its fundamental structure. First, the impact of Airbus
entry on consumer surplus is modest; and secondly, its impact on Boeing's profits is large.
The particular reaction of MDD to Airbus entry is quite sensitive to the details of
model specification. For example, it would take only a small change in the parameters to
ensure that MDD did not produce a rival to the Boeing 737 even if Airbus had never produced
the A-300. Likewise, a small change in parameters (a reduction in the scope parameter, for
example) would mean that MDD still continued to produce the MD-11 even in the absence of
Airbus. However, a more general qualitative result is highly robust. The reaction of MDD (the
weaker rival) to Airbus's entry is the net outcome of two factors that tend in opposite
directions: the direct effect of the Airbus presence in lowering aircraft prices, and the indirect
effect in weakening Boeing and thereby raising aircraft prices. This second effect, which if
sufficiently large can give rise to the Starfish phenomenon, is an important factor in all
reasonable specifications of the model even if it is not always the determinant one.49
The Starfish effect continues to be observed in the high elasticities simulation as well as
that reported using low elasticities (that is, MDD does not produce the MD-11 in the absence
of Airbus). In general the impact of Airbus on prices is weaker when elasticities are high. This
is what one would expect since under these conditions a monopoly or duopoly is less able to
exploit market power. This increases the risk that the pro-competitive effect of Airbus entry
might be outweighed by its adverse impact on the ability of other producers to exploit scale
economies and on their incentive to make R&D investments. Indeed our simulations with high
elasticities reveal a slight negative impact of Airbus entry on (quality-adjusted) prices in the
two medium-range segments (occupied by the A-300 and the A-330/A-340). While we should
not put undue weight on these findings, they do indicate that even the weak impact of Airbus
on prices in our main simulations may be overstated.
The model's qualitative findings are certainly sensitive to assumptions about the likely
course of future demand. This is in contrast to the conjecture that has sometimes been made
about this industry that increased investment in product development would outweigh any
effect of demand expansion and thereby ensure that the market was always likely to be
dominated by one or two producers (see Sutton, 1987). Our results indicate that the indirect
effect of demand expansion on fixed investment is nothing like enough to outweigh the direct
effect of demand expansion. In consequence, how many manufacturers the market can
profitably support will always be sensitive to demand projections.50
There are four respects in which the model's findings may be sensitive to the model's
structure rather than to its specific parameters. First, the model assumes that the only impact of
competition on production costs is by affecting manufacturers' output levels and thus their
ability to reap scale and learning economies. We have not allowed for the possibility that
competition may act as a direct spur to increased efficiency in production methods. There is no
professional consensus about how to model such effects, but there is evidence that they may be
important in some industries. It is likely that taking such phenomena into account would
increase the effect of Airbus entry in lowering aircraft prices.
Secondly, our modelling of production decisions assumes that production capacity is
decided once and for all at the start of a model's production cycle and cannot be subsequently
changed. While this assumption is clearly unrealistic, it is not clear what effect a more realistic
assumption would have on the model's results.
Thirdly, the fact that we ignore the possible strategic motivation for capacity choices
(unlike that for entry decisions) may slightly affect both the calibration of the base run and the
nature of the simulations. The only plausible strategic motivations we have ignored are ones in
early stages that affect subsequent marginal entry decisions by MDD at either stage E or Stage
C, or ones that affect output decisions at stage D. Ignoring these last may mean we have
slightly underestimated the marginal cost of producing the Boeing 737 (because we have
treated actual output as equal to the Cournot output, instead of as exceeding the Cournot output
by an amount designed to induce output reductions by rivals at a later stage); ad hoc simulation51
suggests this would make a very small difference to the overall results, and that the linear
specification of our model may even exaggerate this difference.
       Alternatively, the base run may underestimate the marginal cost of producing the DC-10,
since additional output of the DC-10 beyond the static profit-maximising level might have
contributed to the learning economies that made the decision to develop the MD-11 at stage E
just profitable. It is conceivable also that Boeing may have produced larger numbers of SRNB
aircraft at Stage A than would otherwise have been profitable, in order to deter entry by MDD
at Stage C (where MDD did not in fact enter). Either effect would imply that the presence of
Airbus encourages strategic increases in output at earlier stages because of Airbus's tendency
to weaken MDD and make its entry decisions more marginal; this effect would counteract that
already noticed, in which the knowledge of Airbus's subsequent entry restrains output by
Boeing and MDD at stages A and B because of the anticipated loss of scale and scope
economies. Ignoring the strategic motive for capacity-setting in the simulations, however,
would only really matter as far as MDD's predicted entry at Stage C (with a rival to the Boeing
737) is concerned. It is possible that, in the anticipated absence of Airbus, Boeing might have
wished to produce more SRNB aircraft to deter entry by MDD. This effect works in the
opposite direction from the previous two. And all these effects concern the impact of Airbus on
output at Stages A or B - that is, before Airbus's actual entry. Since there is some doubt in any
case to what extent Boeing and MDD really foresaw so early the subsequent development of
the consortium, it seems to us that the quantitative impact of our ignoring strategic motivations
for capacity-setting is most unlikely to be important.52
Finally, our modelling of investment in aircraft quality is undoubtedly simplistic.
Producers are supposed to maximise profits by choosing a point on a differentiable technology
production function that yields aircraft operating costs as a function of fixed development
costs. This overlooks the possibility that investment may be subject to indivisibilities, and
more profoundly ignores the possibility of R&D expenditures' arising partly out of non-
maximising managerial behaviour: if incentives for R&D expenditure arise more out of threats
to existing profits than out of the prospect of making more, then Airbus may have had a more
beneficial effect on innovation in the industry than our model implies. Furthermore, since
aircraft in a given segment are identical except with regard to operating costs this implies that
all development expenditures by different producers within a segment represent pure
duplication. Given the fact that there is still some differentiation of aircraft even within
segments, once again our methodology may paint an unwarrantedly negative picture of the
impact of Airbus on this market. Quantifying the extent of any bias is, however, a much more
difficult task.
8. Concluding remarks
This paper has modelled the impact of Airbus on the market for large jet aircraft. What
have we learned? Most importantly we have learned that an entrant facing two asymmetric
rivals is in a quite different situation from an entrant facing a single incumbent. Airbus has had
a much less significant effect on prices and outputs in this market than earlier duopoly models
had led us to expect. We have also learned that entry deterrence involves delicate calculations;
when rivals are asymmetric there is a serious danger of the Starfish effect.53
In the light of these sober lessons it is encouraging and perhaps surprising that Airbus is
not Concorde: it has a reasonable chance of making a good if not spectacular profit. This profit
has been bought at the considerable expense of the shareholders of the Boeing Corporation and
(perhaps) the taxpayers of the United States. It is not surprising that they have objected; given
the sums of money at stake it is perhaps more surprising that there have not been more
determined efforts to sponsor transatlantic collusion.54
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A.1.1 Definitions and Equations
There are 4 market segments, indexed i=1,..,4:
1) Short-range, narrow bodied (A 320, B 737, MD-80)
2) Medium range, medium bodied (A 300/310, B 757, B 767)
3) Long-range, medium bodied (A 330/340, B 777, MD-11))
4) Long-range wide bodied (B 747)
Producers are Airbus, Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas, indexed j=1,2,3.
Demand is linear, and chain linked, i.e. there is substitution between products in one
segment and those in neighbouring segments:
(1) kij + mij = ai + biqi + ci(qi+1 + qi-1)
where:
kij represents the annual capital cost to the airline of running the aircraft;
mij represents other costs (basically fuel and maintenance);
qi is total output in segment i.
Note that for segments 1 and 4, one of the two neighbouring segments has demand identically
equal to zero.
kij is in turn a function of the price of the aircraft:
(2) kij = pij(r + D)
where:
pij is the price of the aircraft;
r is the real interest rate;
D is the depreciation rate;37
Equations (1) and (2) together yield an expression for the price of the aircraft:
(3) pij = [ai + biqi + ci(qi+1 + qi-1) - mij]/(r + D)
Costs are likewise linear, and display scale, learning, chain-linked scope and vintage
effects:
(4) Cj = Fj + (α 1j - Γ (Q2j+q2j))q1j + (β 1-δ Q1j)(q1j)
2
    + (α 2j - Γ (Q1j+q1j+Q3j+q3j))q2j + (β 2-δ Q2j)(q2j)
2
    + (α 3j - Γ (Q2j+q2j+Q4j+q4j))q3j + (β 3-δ Q3j)(q3j)
2
    +  (α 4j - Γ (Q3j+q3j))q4j + (β 4-δ Q4j)(q4j)
2
where:
Cj is the total cost of production by producer j.
Fj is the fixed cost of production by producer j (which is a function of the segments in
which it operates).
α ij is a vintage-specific cost parameter for the model produced in segment i by producer
j (capturing the idea that the cost of production of a model may depend on factors
peculiar to its vintage).
Qij represents cumulative output in segment i by producer j (to capture learning effects).
Γ  and δ  represent respectively scope and learning parameters.38
A.1.2 Solving the Model
We can use equations (3) and (4) to formulate a profit function which will then be
differentiated with respect to output. In principle, since output in one segment affects prices
(and therefore profit) in neighbouring segments, we should differentiate the global profit
function for all segments considered together. In practice, to simplify notation we can define the
incremental profit function for producer j in segment i as those components of profit in
segments i-1, i and i+1 considered together that are affected by output in segment i:
(5) π ij = qij [ai + biqi + ci(qi+1 + qi-1) - mij]/(r + D)
+ qi-1,j [ai-1 + bi-1qi-1 + ci-1(qi + qi-2) - mi-1,j]/(r + D)
+ qi+1,j [ai+1 + bi+1qi+1 + ci+1(qi+2 + qi) - mi+1,j]/(r + D)
- Fij - (α ij - Γ (Qi-1,j+qi-1,j+Qi+1,j+qi+1,j))qij + (β i-δ Qij)(qij)
2
- (α i-1,j - Γ (Qi-2,j+qi-2,j+Qij+qij))qi-1,j
- (α i+1,j - Γ (Qi+2,j+qi+2,j+Qij+qij))qi+1,j
where Fij is the incremental fixed cost associated with entry by producer j into segment i.
Differentiating (5) with respect to qij yields:
(6) dπ ij/dqij = [ai + biqi + ci(qi+1 + qi-1) - mij]/(r + D)
+ [biqij + ci-1qi-1,j + ci+1qi+1,j]/(r + D)
- (α ij - Γ (Qi-1,j+qi-1,j+Qi+1,j+qi+1,j))
- 2qij(β i-δ Qij)
+ Γ (qi-1,j+qi+1,j)
Setting equation (6) equal to zero for j=1,2,3 and substituting qi=qi1+qi2+qi3 yields a
system of simultaneous equations in the three variables qi1,qi2 and qi3. This system is very
lengthy to solve by hand, so we have used a Mathematica programme to do so. The solutions
are described in Appendix 3.
Essentially this solution technique involves assuming that the output decision in each
segment is taken simultaneously by the three producers, with each one treating as parametric its
own (historically given) past and (rationally anticipated) future output in other segments, as well39
as the output of its competitors in all segments. This latter is the Cournot assumption, which
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have shown is a reasonable approximation to a form of
competition in which producers first choose production capacity and then compete in prices.
There are six stages of the model, which correspond to a stylised account of the history
of the civil airliner market from the mid-1960s to the late 1990s. At each stage producers choose
once and for all the level of production capacity (i.e. output) over the 25-year life of the model
produced:
A (early 1960s): The players decide whether to enter segment 1 [this corresponds to the decision
by Boeing to produce the 727 and 737, and by MDD to produce the DC-9]
B (late 1960s): Segment 4 [Boeing 747, MDD DC-10]
C (1970s): Segment 2 [Airbus 300,310, B 757,767]
D (early 1980s): Segment 1 [Airbus 320, B 737, MD-80]
E (late 1980s): Segment 3 [A-330,340, B 777, MD-11]
F (late 1990s): Segment 4 [replacements for the 747?]
The model is solved backwards, in the following way. First stage F is solved, taking as
parametric the (historically given) value of output in the other segments. Then stage E is solved,
taking the historical value of output in stages A-D and the equilibrium value of output in stage F
(and so on analogously for other stages). We then check whether, at any stage, the equilibrium
entry decision of any producer would be different if, instead of historical output data, the
equilibrium were calculated using the outputs that would have been chosen if some producer X
at an earlier stage had made a non-equilibrium entry decision. If so, we compare the total profits
for producer X under the two historical sequences and choose as the solution to the model the
one that yields the highest total profits.
For the base run, which attempts to reproduce history, there is by definition a fairly close
correspondence between historical and equilibrium values of output. For counterfactual
simulations, we have undertaken a first run from which we extract equilibrium output values
that are then entered as historical values in the second run; the results of the two runs are usually
very similar, indicating that the model converges rapidly.
There are two small qualifications to the temporal structure of the model. One is that
production in the different market segments is not simultaneous, so that cross-elasticities are not
strictly valied for the whole production run of a model. The solution we have adopted is the
following. Stages C and E (corresponding to segments 2 and 3) overlap with both an earlier and
a later stage in which productions are made in a neighbouring segment (decisions in Stage C
overlap with production in stages A and D; decisions in stage E overlap with production in40
stages B and F). Prices in these segments are determined as the weighted average of the prices
that would obtain if there were full overlap with either of the two relevant stages. The weights
are parameters lambda2 and lambda3, which can be interpreted as the proportion of its life that
aircraft in segments 2 and 3 respectively will be competing against the earlier model in a
neighbouring segment as opposed to competing against the replacement models. At other stages
we have assumed full overlap, but have chosen relatively modest cross-elasticities  to relfect the
fact that in practice there will be competition from neighbouring segments only for some of a
model's lifetime.
The second temporal qualification is that we have treated the introduction of the DC-10
as belonging to segment 4 (instead of segment 3 where it would more naturally belong). This is
to avoid introducing an additional decision in segment 3 earlier in the model, which would
considerably increase the computational complexity of the model while yielding little new
insight. However, we have assumed that learning economies were utilised by McDonnell-
Douglas in building the MD-11.
A.1.3 Endogenising Product Development
The model can also be used to endogenise expenditure on research and development, by
making operating costs of the aircraft a function of fixed development costs, and examining the
way in which different hypotheses about market structure affect the incentives of manufacturers
to invest in reducing these costs. To do this we differentiate equation (5) with respect to Fij.
Setting the derivative equal to zero, we can appeal to the envelope theorem to ignore any effect
of changing fixed costs on the optimal value of qij when small changes are considered. This
procedure yields:
(7) dπ ij/dFij = -qij[dmij/dFij]/(r+D) - 1 = 0
Multiplying by Fij/mij gives the equilibrium level of fixed costs:
(8) Fij = qij.mij.hij/(r+D)
where hij is the (absolute value of the) elasticity of aircraft operating costs with respect to fixed
costs.
Solving (8), which has two unknowns, requires choosing a function relating Fij to mij. We have
chosen for simplicity a constant elasticity cost function:
(9) m = k(F)
-h41
where subscripts are omitted for notational convenience. Substituting (9) in (8) yields an
expression for F*, the optimal value of F:
(10) F* = (kqh/(r+D))
H,
where H = 1/(1-h).
It is worth noting that the choice of a constant elasticity form (coupled with the
calibration methods we discuss below) probably somewhat exaggerates the incentive for
manufacturers to make investments in reducing operating costs; it has been suggested to us that
the elasticity probably falls as development costs rise. However, since the qualitative results we
report do not differ according to whether or not we endogenise development costs, the fact that
the true value of endogenous development costs may lie somewhere between the two cases
suggests the model's findings are fairly robust to this modification.
We have used the same method for incorporating cost endogeneity in our counterfactual
simulations as for incorporating output variation. That is, we run a simulation with changed
parameters, observe the endogenous costs and then run a second simulation with those costs
entered as new parameters and report the results of the second run; again the difference between
first and second runs is usually small.42
Appendix 2: Data and Calibration Methods
The model just described has 23 industry parameters and 32 manufacturer-specific
parameters, making 119 (= 32 X 3 + 23) parameter values to be chosen in total. Some of these
parameters represent historical values of variables (such as output or operating costs) that the
model also generates endogenously. Actual parameter values are supplied with the results of
each model run. We have chosen them in the following way:
Non-capital operating costs (18 values: i.e. 3 per stage):
Data supplied by the DTI for actual models, plausible guesses used where a
manufacturer has no model in the relevant segment. All costs and prices are in millions of US
dollars. We have standardised for size where competing models differ.
Fixed costs per stage (18 values):
DTI estimates of average fixed costs, tempered by own guesswork as to variations in
such costs between producers and via sharing between programmes in different segments. Note
that fixed costs affect only entry decisions, not outputs conditional on entry. They do, however,
affect estimates of rates of return, which is another reason for treating such estimates with
caution.
Historical outputs (12 values):
DTI records and projections, tempered by own guesswork. Only 12 values are needed
because historical values of stages D and F do not enter into solutions of other stages.
Accumulated learning (18 values):
These are just historical outputs of models relevant to production at a given stage. Only
four values are non-zero, corresponding in segment D to prior production of the 727, 737 and
DC-9, in segment E to prior production of the DC-10 and in segment F to prior production of
the 747.
Interest and depreciation (1 value):
We have chosen a long run value of 0.15, based on 6% real interest plus 9%
depreciation, which is consistent with the operating cost data supplied us by DTI. Higher values
would tend to damage Boeing and Airbus and help McDonnell-Douglas, since the latter's
aircraft tend to have lower capital and higher non-capital operating costs. Coversely, lower
values in the simulations would weaken McDonnell-Douglas.
Economies of scale (4 values):43
In each segment we have chosen a parameter that gives, at the mean value of output, an
approximation to the view, widely accepted in the industry, that a doubling of output would be
expected to yield a 20% fall in marginal costs of production.
Economies of scope (1 value):
Here there is no comparable industry consensus that we have been able to ascertain. We
have chosen a linear approximation to the two values of the scope parameter of Klepper (1990),
using his higher value of 0.0033 for our base case.
Economies of learning (1 value):
The parameter here is chosen to approximate the view that a 100% increase in
accumulated production leads to a 20% saving in variable cost. The main effect of alternative
values is on prices in segment D, where lower values lead to slightly higher prices in the
alternative simulations but leave the base run unaffected.
Marginal production costs (12 values):
The intercept of the marginal cost curve is specific to each segment and each producer
(changes in marginal costs between different stages of segments 1 and 4 are in effect captured
by changes in the values of m). We have chosen these values so that, at equilibrium outputs,
variable costs are approximately equal to 60% of historical revenues, in line with the industry
consensus on the division of costs into fixed and variable components. However, after
calibration of the demand function (see below) we have then adjusted the relative values of α ij
within each stage so as to reproduce approximately the historical market shares. The values of
α ij can then be interpreted as embodying not only marginal costs of production as such but also
any differences in manufacturers' ability to produce to customers' specifications (such as
differences in perceived reliability, convenience etc.).
Own-price demand coefficients (4 values):
Once the marginal cost curve is determined, calibration to historical output levels
determines the point of intersection of the marginal cost and marginal revenue curves, and
calibration to historical prices determines the slope of the marginal revenue curve (and hence, in
a linear model, the demand curve).
Demand intercepts (6 values):
These are determined by the same process that determines the own-price elasticities.
Note, however, that intercepts may differ between stages A and D, and between B and F, since
historical outputs differ, but we have constrained price coefficients to be the same.
Cross-price demand coefficients (4 values):44
Lacking either data on these or an effective means of calibration we have chose them to
lie at between 10% and 5% of the own-price values. This reflects a view that aircraft in
neighbouring segments are a fairly poor substitute for one another, at least over the range of
price variation under consideration here. This does not mean, however, that cross-price effects
are unimportant, since they may affect the profitability of an entry decision. Setting all cross-
price effects to zero in our base run induces entry by McDonnell-Douglas at stage C, since now
the aircraft produced in segment 2 have no depressant effect on the prices of the MD-80 and the
MD-11.
Lambda (2 values):
Chosen at 0.3 and 0.5 to capture degree of historical overlap between stages.
Elasticities of operating costs with respect to development costs (18 values):
For each producer at each stage, h is chosen approximately to satisfy equation (8) with
respect to historical outputs and fixed costs. In other words it is assumed that producers were
optimising in choosing their development costs. The value of k is then chosen to satisfy
equation (9) for historical levels of operating costs. Equation (10) then determines optimal fixed
costs, which will by definition be approximately equal to actual fixed costs for the base run. For
simulations, (10) and (9) determine the optimal fixed and operating costs respectively.45
Appendix 3
Solutions to First Order Conditions
The following are the solutions generated by Mathematica to the system of first order conditions









Aj= -ai+mij-ci*qi-1-ci-1*qi-1,j-ci*qi+1-ci+1*qi+1,j+α ij*(r+D)-2*Γ *qi-1j*(r+D)-Γ *Qi-1,j*(r+D)-2*Γ *qi+1,j*(r+D)-
Γ *Qi+1,j*(r+D)














Aj=(-ai+mij-ci*qi-1-ci-1*qi-1,j-ci*qi+1-ci+1*qi+1,j+α ij*(r+D)-2*Γ *qi-1,j*(r+D)-Γ *Qi-1,j*(r+D)-2*Γ *qi+1,j*(r+D)-
Γ *Qi+1,j*(r+D))




Aj= [(2bi)/(r+D)-2*(β i-δ *Qij)]
-1
Bj= (-ai+mij-ci*(qi+1+qi-1)-ci-1qi-1,j-ci+1qi+1,j)1/(r+D)
Cj= α ij-Γ *(Qi+1,j+2qi-1,j+2qi+1,j+Qi-1,j)
The solutions in the three-player case are hard to interpret intuitively. However, it is
helpful to begin from the one-player case. The term (B+C) is essentially a measure of how far
apart are the intercepts of the monopolist's marginal cost and marginal revenue curves (B
defining the marginal revenue and C the marginal cost, taking cross-effects into account). The
term A measures the difference in slope between the two curves (which depends on the
elasticity of demand but also on the degree of scale economies) and consequently determines
at what level of output they will intersect.
The equations in the two-player and three-player cases use the same principle but applied
not to market demand but to residual demand (i.e. the demand left over once the rival firms'
output has been sold). The term A in both cases measures the distance apart of the intercepts
of the marginal cost and marginal revenue curves. One firm's output will, other things equal,
be increasing in this distance and decreasing in the analogous distance of its rivals (since has
a negative impact on the first firm's residual demand). The term B in both cases represents the
difference in slope between the two curves, with once again the value of B for a firm's rivals
being a determinant of its own output.